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Domestic contestation and presidential 
prerogative in Colombian foreign policy
Abstract 
Analysts of Colombian foreign policy emphasise external constraints and presidential 
prerogative. We find evidence that these commonplace presidentialist assumptions are too 
deterministic and broadly applied. Drawing on insights from recent Foreign Policy Analysis 
literature and evidence from several cases (Plan Colombia, US military bases, free trade talks 
with China, and ICJ arbitration of a maritime border with Nicaragua), we propose a model 
that better captures how Colombian domestic actors mobilize to raise political costs to block 
or modify presidential preferences. When the opposition fails to raise costs, presidentialist 
assumptions apply. Otherwise, presidents respond strategically by abandoning or substituting 
second-best policies. 
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Domestic contestation and presidential prerogative in Colombian 
foreign policy 
The conventional wisdom on Colombian foreign policymaking, and Latin American 
Foreign Policy Analysis (LAFPA) more broadly, emphasises external constraints and, within 
those constraints, presidential discretion vis-à-vis domestic actors. In its strong form, what we 
call the ‘presidentialist paradigm’ suggests that, absent international opposition, presidents 
insulate foreign policy decisionmaking from domestic opposition to advance their priorities. 
Domestic opposition might exist, but rarely alters or rejects presidential foreign policy 
preferences. Presidentialist assumptions remain prevalent in LAFPA, even as the literature on 
domestic politics increasingly recognizes constraints on presidents. In a recent survey of the 
LAFPA literature, Malamud (2015) suggests: ‘The prominent role that Latin American 
presidents have played in crafting and implementing foreign policy is well established’. 
Lopes et. al. (2016) describe ‘foreign policies with little or no social articulation’ as 
predominant in Latin America. Regarding Colombia, Amaya (2017) concludes that the 
presidentialist paradigm functions as a ‘common place truth’, obscuring dynamics outside the 
president’s office.  
Are domestic actors so marginal? Or is their influence overlooked due to 
presidentialist assumptions? Adapting advances in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) by Milner 
and Tingley (2015), we offer of a model of how domestic actors impose costs and use 
institutional and political veto points to shape foreign policy (Tsebelis 2002). Domestic actors 
can impose substantial costs on presidents, forcing strategic responses. Depending on the 
level of costs imposed, Colombian presidents abandon, modify, or substitute for their 
preferred policy. The opposition’s ability to mobilize costs varies depending on political and 
institutional context, as well as the type of foreign policy issue. Issues implicating territorial 
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sovereignty might have broader political salience while those with distributional effects spark 
interest group responses. Colombian foreign policymaking is not as insulated from domestic 
pressures as formal institutional design, and much analysis, suggests. Presidents are key 
actors in foreign policy, but our model of ‘contested presidentialism’ foregrounds domestic 
contestation and strategic presidential responses. 
The article first reviews the literature on Colombian Foreign Policy Analysis (CFPA), 
situated within LAFPA. We build on those literatures, and on FPA more broadly, to construct 
a model that systematically integrates domestic actors and processes. After presenting our 
research design and methods, we examine four cases of Colombian foreign policy: President 
Álvaro Uribe’s plan for US bases, Colombia’s response to an adverse International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) ruling, a Colombia-China free-trade proposal, and the initiation of Plan 
Colombia. We compare these four cases, considering alternative explanations of international 
constraints, strong presidentialism, bureaucratic contestation, and coalitional politics. We 
conclude with lessons and suggestions for future research.  
Presidentialism and Colombian Foreign Policy 
The literature on Colombian foreign policy emphasises international constraints and 
presidential prerogative in navigating them. Despite our largely state-level focus, a word on 
international constraints is needed. Regardless of theoretical approach, most work on CFPA 
emphasises the United States’ centrality to Colombian international relations: Colombia 
adapts to US interests and seeks returns from a ‘special’, even if asymmetrical, relationship 
with Washington (Bernal and Ticker, 2017). Histories of Colombian foreign policy 
emphasise presidential prerogative in managing the country’s relationship with the United 
States, starting with President Marco Fidel Suárez’s (1918-1921) doctrine of respice polum, 
or looking north (Drekonja Kornat, 1982; Pardo and Tokatlian, 1988). Presidentialism shapes 
the formats through which CFPA is studied, with volumes, special issues, and articles 
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assessing individual presidential periods being especially common. Though some presidents 
tried to rebalance Colombia’s international insertion, in practice, maintaining an intimate 
relationship with the United States remained vital (Tickner and Borda, 2011; Amaya, 2017; 
Bitar and Tickner, 2017). Recently, unflinching alignment characterised Uribe’s presidency 
(2002-2010), while Santos (2010-2018) attempted moderate diversification. Emphasis on the 
United States and international systemic constraints is a common feature of broader LAFPA 
(Bertucci, 2013; Mora and Hey, 2003), even as scholars increasingly stress Colombian and 
Latin American agency (Tickner, 2007; Long, 2015: 194-211). 
As a result of theoretical influences and institutional design, a focus on presidential 
prerogative is more prominent in the study of foreign policy than domestic politics. The 
presidentialist approach has a long lineage in FPA—it resembles the first model in the classic 
Essence of Decision, in which the unitary executive responds rationally to the international 
system (Allison 1971). It is compatible with realism, which has played a predominant role in 
the study of IR and foreign policy in Latin America (Tickner, 2003). Presidentialist 
explanations are reinforced by Latin American institutional design. The classic comparative 
literature on domestic politics considered Latin American states to be strong presidentialist 
systems (Shugart and Mainwaring, 1997), where presidents used constitutional powers to 
avoid bargaining with Congress (Shugart and Carey, 1992). Recent work shows how these 
powers have eroded somewhat since the late 1990s (Pérez-Liñán, 2005; Negretto, 2009), 
highlighting a greater diversity of actors (eg., Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013). In foreign 
affairs, however, presidents retain broad de jure constitutional powers: ‘compared with other 
democracies Latin American presidents have exceptionally wide-ranging competences in this 
(and other) policy areas’ (Jenne et. al., 2017: 5). Due to this, Gardini and Lambert (2011:6) 
argue, ‘The stature and quality of leaders and their worldviews and beliefs have a strong 
impact on foreign policy’ in presidentialist Latin American politics. Colombia is an extreme 
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case of presidentialist foreign policy institutions; formally, the president directs foreign 
policy via the foreign minister, with limited input from a nonbinding, closed advisory 
commission that operates under presidential discretion.  
Given this theoretical and institutional background, academic and popular treatments 
tend to treat Colombian foreign policy as a distinctive, insulated sphere where government-
opposition quarrels have little relevance. A recent FPA study of Plan Colombia’s initiation, 
which we also explore, argues the policy emerged from groupthink and that Colombia’s 
foreign policy structures disallowed “debates or controversy” (Monroy and Sánchez 2017: 
250). Outside Latin America, however, the FPA literature has evolved to give greater 
attention to two-level politics, legislative constraints, and pressures from interest groups 
(Evans et al., 1993; Milner, 1997; Milner and Tingley, 2015). In LAFPA, conversely, there 
are few studies of interbranch relations and those that exist underscore the weakness of 
domestic constraints (Lima and Santos, 2001; Gardini, 2010). Ribeiro and Pinheiro 
(2016:489) argue that foreign policy serves as ‘a vehicle for political parties to establish their 
ideological positions’ rather than to exercise a legislative veto on policy. Nor is there 
substantial, systematic attention to non-legislative, domestic limitations. Executive 
bureaucracies have received little attention in the study of Latin American politics, note 
Polga-Hecimovich and Trelles (2016), though they do not separately address foreign affairs. 
Brazil’s influential foreign ministry, Itamaraty, was a partial exception (de Faria et. al., 
2013), but recent scholarship on Brazil also increasingly focuses on overriding 
presidentialism (Cason and Power 2009; Fenwick et. al. 2017). 
Two recent studies make important strides in including domestic factors in explaining 
Latin American foreign policy, regarding interstate rivalries. Darnton (2014) argues that 
bureaucratic interests, particularly militaries, acted as ‘spoilers’ for presidents’ peacemaking 
initiatives. By making end-runs around the president, they undermine presidential discretion 
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to protect their own budgets and missions. For Darnton, the most important costs are intra-
governmental. For Schenoni (2017), presidents faced shifting domestic social coalitions in 
responding to international factors, in his case, rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil. 
When the pro-rivalry coalition disintegrates, a president is less constrained domestically and 
so responds to cost signals from the international system. While presidentialism tends to 
overlook costs imposed by domestic actors, bureaucratic explanations emphasize costs 
imposed by intra-governmental disputes. Coalitional explanations go beyond the executive 
but focus less on institutional context and more on how presidents assemble political support 
for their preferences. We explore these factors further below in Colombian context. 
Toward a Model of Contested Presidentialism 
Presidentialism is not an unreasonable starting point for understanding Colombian foreign 
policy. Presidents often have advanced their initial preferences through insulation of the 
policy process or co-optation of opposition. Such dynamics characterized the Colombian 
bombing of a Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) camp in Ecuador in 
2008 (Marcella 2008), the inclusion of international actors in the Colombian peace process 
(Borda and Gómez, 2015), and the negotiation of the US-Colombia Trade Promotion 
Agreement (Silva, 2007). However, these examples are countered by others where presidents 
struggle to advance their policy preferences. How can we better understand cases where 
presidentialist expectations are not met? 
Adapting Milner and Tingley’s (2015) research on US foreign policy and work on 
veto players (Tsebelis, 2002) to the Colombian context, we highlight mechanisms for 
domestic opposition and illustrate how opponents impose costs on presidents that might lead 
to rejection of their preferences. As in Milner and Tingley, actors oppose foreign policy 
decisions that provoke distributional concerns or touch latent ideological issues, especially 
when they can be strategically utilised by the opposition. However, differences in 
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institutional arrangements and historical patterns are crucial. In Colombia, questions of 
electoral cycles, salience, and timing are particularly important for establishing political and 
institutional veto points, as are the roles of opposition parties, Congress, and the courts.  
We propose a stylised four-step model of contested presidentialism (Figure 1), which 
diverges from traditional presidentialist assumptions about who is relevant to foreign policy. 
In our model, the president first expresses a foreign policy preference. As in the 
presidentialist approach, presidential preferences integrate personal policy goals with 
consideration of international-level constraints and opportunities. Presidential preference 
formation is treated as exogenous to our focus on overlooked domestic interactions. 
Establishing ‘true’ intentions is perhaps unattainable, so we take the pragmatic decision to 
focus on empirically observable declared or demonstrated preferences. Difficult-to-observe 
anticipated reactions may in fact lead analysts to understate the influence of domestic 
political actors on presidential foreign policy (Lindsay 1992).  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
The second step concerns the mobilization of domestic opposition. As Milner and 
Tingley argue, certain issues are more likely to trigger contestation, such as when the 
opposition successfully politicises ideological divisions or when policies have distributional 
consequences for powerful interests. As the political economy literature indicates, interest 
groups are shaped by ‘distributional consequences of international agreements’ (Milner, 
1997:61), and they pressure decision makers to safeguard their positions. Conversely, 
ideology can be understood as ‘beliefs about dispositions of foreign actors and the 
appropriate way to deploy government resources to deal with them’ (Milner and Tingley, 
2015:58). When particular foreign policies have an ideological coherence that conflicts with 
the dispositions of other salient political actors, the resulting divisions can be mobilised by a 
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determined opposition. In Latin America foreign policy, issues that relate to intervention and 
territorial sovereignty may be especially sensitive. 
If the preferred policy triggers domestic contestation along distributional and/or 
ideological lines, opposition actors will seek to block or shape the policy by imposing 
political costs through formal or informal veto processes. Formal vetoes include denying 
ratification of necessary legislation or challenges in domestic courts. Informal vetoes include 
heightening risks associated with the electoral calendar or undermining legislative support for 
the government’s broader agenda, perhaps through defecting from legislative coalitions. The 
formal institutional context matters, in addition to lobbying and power politics, because 
independent courts may give less powerful actors access to a veto capacity.  
Whether a policy can be blocked is a question of the opposition’s ability to access 
electoral, legislative, or judicial veto points and impose political costs. When political costs 
are effectively raised, a president would have to bear costs to continue with a policy, or 
modify or abandon the policy to eschew costs. As political costs grow or become more 
evident, the president is likely to move away from the initial preference. High costs are 
understood as a threat to the president’s position or continuation in power; medium costs 
create challenges to the president’s agenda without threatening his/her position; low costs 
include friction but no clear political threat. Different levels of political costs will provoke 
different outcomes. When faced with high costs, a president may abandon the policy. More 
often, when facing medium costs, presidents will seek to advance the goal through other, less 
preferred means. Instead of accepting defeat, presidents will attempt to substitute policies that 
minimise divisions or avoid vetoes (Milner and Tingley, 2015; Starr, 2000). 
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Research Design and Methods 
To explore the limitations of the presidentialist logic in Colombia, we examine four salient 
cases of foreign policy decision-making. In all four, domestic opposition emerged to 
presidential preferences. In three, significant modifications of the initial preferred policy 
occurred, while in the fourth presidential preferences advanced despite opposition. We 
intentionally selected cases for variation in outcome, with prima facie divergence from the 
expectations of presidentialist LAFPA in three cases. As Bennett and Elman (2006: 462) 
note, ‘such deviant cases may also yield information about previously unidentified causal 
mechanisms that may also operate in other cases’. Selecting cases on outcome is a widely 
accepted design to challenge deterministic theory, explore common mechanisms, and propose 
theoretical insights that could guide the exploration of other cases (Seawright and Gerring, 
2008: 303; George and Bennett, 2005: 20-28). The three cases of presidential preference 
modification allow exploration of processes of domestic opposition; the case of presidential 
success demonstrates the absence of mechanisms through which opposition succeeded 
elsewhere. There is an important limitation to this research design, however. We do not claim 
to have a representative sample of Colombian foreign policy decisions, so we cannot make 
generalizable predictions of presidential success and failure more broadly. Instead, we 
highlight common processes of opposition and examine presidential responses in order to 
challenge rigid assumptions about presidential prerogative in CFPA. 
 The case narratives build on the secondary literature, press, and documents, as well 
as fieldwork conducted by the authors. The four brief accounts contextualize the policy, 
identify presidential preferences, and then chronologically describe the presence and process 
of opposition and presidential responses to the opposition. We then describe the case’s 
outcome and compare it to the expectations of the presidentialist model.  
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Case studies 
In the following section, we ask why Colombian presidents have sometimes retreated 
to alternative policies in key cases of Colombian foreign policy decisions during the last two 
decades. After exploring the cases, we consider Darnton’s (2014) and Schenoni’s (2017) 
arguments to examine whether they are sufficient to account for the evidence. Though useful, 
these prominent domestically focused explanations are not sufficient for our cases.
Case 1: Plan Colombia 
Presidentialist assumptions remain engrained in part because they reflect the outcomes of 
many significant cases. To contrast the processes of salient domestic opposition in the later 
cases, we first examine a case that unfolds largely as the presidentialist argument implies. In 
the creation of Plan Colombia, a Colombian president drew on US support to achieve his 
policy goals in the face of ineffective domestic opposition (Avilés 2008). 
In the late 1990s, President Andrés Pastrana took a major step in internationalizing the 
Colombian conflict through a dramatic expansion of existing cooperation with the United 
States (Borda and Tickner, 2011; Tickner, 2007). Pastrana’s policy preferences, enunciated in 
1998-99, focused on using external resources to strengthen the Colombian state in military 
and institutional terms. This occurred in the context of demonstrable military weakness and 
largely stillborn peace negotiations with the FARC. Plan Colombia represented a quantitative 
and qualitative increase in cooperation with the United States – namely boosting resources 
directed to the security sector, though civilian and human rights programs also saw more 
funding. Qualitatively, Plan Colombia produced a gradual shift from the focus on 
transnational drug trafficking to the internal Colombian conflict (Long, 2015: 212-216). 
Pastrana also sought US support for peace negotiations with the FARC; direct participation 
was paused after leaks about secret meetings between State Department officials and FARC 
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representatives and definitively ended after FARC members killed three US missionaries. 
However, the Clinton administration continued to tolerate Pastrana’s concessions to the 
FARC until the stagnated negotiations collapsed amidst continued violence on both sides. 
Despite the serious security situation, the proposal for Plan Colombia sparked 
vociferous domestic opposition in Colombia (Tate, 2015: 191-217). The strongest critiques 
came from the FARC, who saw US security assistance as proof of bad faith from the 
government. Criticism was echoed by civil society organizations on the left of Colombian 
electoral politics. However, this opposition had little access to institutional or political veto 
points within Colombia.   
Pastrana’s success in advancing Plan Colombia did not emerge from his political 
strength or deft management of domestic politics. At the time, the State Department worried 
that dismal popular support for Pastrana – just 21 percent – would undermine implementation 
(Romero 2000). The president’s relations with the Colombian Congress were so contentious 
that Pastrana proposed new elections to disband the body; Congress responded by threatening 
the same against him. Despite that, only a handful of legislators expressed serious opposition 
to Plan Colombia (Long 2015: 220-221). Nor did criticism of Plan Colombia resound with a 
public that increasingly demanded a harsher approach to the FARC by 2001. The electoral 
environment provided few veto points against Plan Colombia. 
In distributional terms, Plan Colombia offered new resources, with many interest 
groups benefitting (Avilés, 2008: 415-418). The military received the most, but many groups 
got something. Few actors with institutional access lost out. As Tate (2015) shows, Plan 
Colombia harmed the interests of marginalised constituents, such as coca-growing 
campesinos in the Putumayo region, but their lack of electoral weight or institutional access 
meant they had little influence on Colombian policymaking; their attention was instead 
directed towards US NGOs with the hope of creating external constraints. In the Colombian 
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political mainstream, polarization around greater US involvement was muted. Colombia’s 
main political forces had all supported US involvement, particularly around drug trafficking 
(Crandall, 2008). Liberal Party candidate Horacio Serpa and his previous boss President 
Ernesto Samper had contentious relations with the United States, but neither could mobilise 
electoral support against Plan Colombia. Instead, the growing political opposition to Pastrana 
focused not on his bellicose cooperation with the United States but on his attempts to reach 
negotiated peace with the FARC. Without a Congressional or electoral pathway, or access to 
veto processes, even an unpopular president easily marginalised domestic opposition, 
congruent with presidential expectations.
Case 2: US Military Bases 
In the mid-2000s, amidst growing tensions with Venezuela, Colombian President Uribe 
expressed concerns to the United States about his country’s lack of defensive capabilities vis-
a-vis its neighbour. Uribe believed that a formal US military presence in Colombia would 
signal US commitment and deter Venezuela (Bitar, 2015: ch. 5; Carvajal, 2011). Negotiations 
for an enhanced US-Colombian security cooperation agreement started in 2005, with the goal 
of establishing seven US military bases in Colombia. US interest was increased by Ecuador’s 
decision not to renew a US basing lease at Manta, due to expire in 2009. In addition to the 
bases, Uribe requested a US commitment to supply Colombia with materiel in case of a 
conflict with Venezuela and access to an anti-aerial defence system. Uribe negotiated the 
accords in secret, then moved to sign the agreement without congressional review, citing 
presidential authority to expand previous bilateral treaties. Uribe favoured the agreement 
even after the US de-linked base access from military concessions. Given his popularity and 
Colombia’s traditional alignment with the United States, Uribe expected to advance the bases 
without domestic contestation (Bitar and González, 2018), even requesting that the agreement 
be worded in a way that eschewed the need for congressional ratification. 
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The agreement enjoyed strong support from Uribe’s broad political coalition, 
including Defence Minister Santos, who later succeeded Uribe in the presidency, and leading 
legislators, who did not demand Congressional involvement. However, partial information 
about the deal leaked in 2008, provoking opposition along ideological lines from social 
movements and leftist parties in Colombia. However, the sound and fury of domestic 
opposition exceeded its ability to impose political costs. Domestic opponents lacked 
congressional strength to block the agreement, nor did the issue generate adequate electoral 
opposition to threaten a strong, recently re-elected president.  
Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela adamantly opposed an increased US military presence 
in South America. Uribe personally visited or called most South American presidents to 
explain the agreement and calm their concerns (Carvajal, 2011: 296-301). US Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defence Robert Gates, and President Barack Obama 
issued assurances that the US presence would not affect Colombia’s neighbors. Furthermore, 
Colombia threatened to walk away from Unasur, Brazil’s regional project, demonstrating that 
Uribe prioritised the bases over regional pressures (Bitar 2015: 135-138). Despite adamant 
opposition from Venezuela and strong reservations from Brazil, with the help of Peru, Chile, 
Uruguay and Paraguay, Colombia blocked a regional declaration against the bases and 
ultimately moved to complete the agreement. Uribe, it seemed, had turned back regional 
pressures and cautiously insulated the agreement from domestic opposition. 
When it seemed the crisis had passed, in 2009, a local magazine revealed that the 
agreements would grant immunity to US personnel in Colombia and allow a permanent US 
presence. Colombian NGOs demanded a review from the Constitutional Court, arguing that 
the agreement created new obligations that had to be ratified as a new treaty. In August 2010, 
the court declared the agreement void without congressional approval. The court’s decision 
came as President Santos took office, forcing the new president to send the agreement to 
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Congress or let it perish. Despite his earlier personal support for the agreement, Santos feared 
the politicised ratification process would weaken his Congressional coalition, which he 
needed to advance an eventual peace process with the FARC. Instead, Santos found a formula 
of policy substitution in the form ‘quasi-bases’ (Bitar 2015). Colombia offered base access 
without permanent or formal leases, relying on tacit understandings and expansive 
interpretations of previous agreements. US operations continued, including military training, 
drug interdiction, communications, and surveillance (Bitar 2015, 153). Santos’ second-best 
option convinced the United States that while a formal agreement was preferable, it was 
unnecessary. The two sides achieved some goals while protecting Santos’ political capital. 
Strong presidentialist assumptions would project Uribe’s preference for bases to 
materialise without major constraints. Thanks to US support, the external environment was 
favourable, even in the face of furious, but ultimately ineffective, criticism from Colombia’s 
neighbours. Given the bases’ high priority and relevance for national security, one would 
expect the president to isolate the agreement from domestic institutions and implement his 
preferred policy.  
Case 3: Colombian Trade with China 
During a 2012 state visit to China, President Santos personally announced preliminary studies 
for the negotiation of a free trade agreement (FTA) with China. Santos called the proposed 
China FTA ‘very, very important’ for his administration’s economic agenda and argued that 
an FTA would attract Chinese investment, stimulate exports of meat and dairy products, and 
improve Colombia’s international economic insertion. The countries quickly signed a 
memorandum of understanding to review the feasibility of an FTA (El Tiempo 2012; Semana 
2012; Cancillería 2012). Building on previous high-level visits, the Santos administration 
sought to boost Colombian agricultural exports to China and redress Colombia’s large 
commercial deficit with the country (Pastrana Buelvas et. al., 2017).  
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Domestic opposition, even to a proposed FTA study group, was intense. The proposal 
touched distributional concerns affecting powerful interests. Colombian imports from China 
had increased nearly eight times over a decade, with Chinese manufactured exports often 
competing with Colombian industry (Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2010: 46-56),  Colombian 
employers and industrialists sought to fend off Chinese competition. They responded to the 
proposal with ‘intensified requests to protect domestic products’ (El Tiempo, 2014), and 
denounced Chinese-origin counterfeit and contraband goods. In response, Colombia enacted 
antidumping measures against many Chinese imports (MCIT, 2016). In addition, Colombian 
industrial exporters had barely penetrated the Chinese market and perceived limited 
opportunities there (Pastrana Buelvas et. al., 2017: 423).  
The proposed talks sparked a struggle between two influential business associations 
and their allies. The National Industrial Association (ANDI) opposed the proposed FTA, in 
contrast with its support for an earlier deal with the USA. ANDI’s position was supported by 
a ‘pro-industria coalition’ of automobile industry manufacturers, entrepreneurs, unions, 
academics, NGOs, and politicians. In Colombia, opposition to FTAs typically originates from 
the left, but in this case, fear of competition sparked criticism from pro-business conservative 
sectors, including from Santos’ political allies. ANDI exercised extraordinary influence. Its 
director, Luis Carlos Villegas, was Santos’ friend; he was appointed Ambassador to 
Washington soon after helping kill the proposed FTA with China. Former Conservative 
Senator Marta Lucía Ramírez, an ANDI ally, argued: ‘It’s good to look at Asia, but an FTA 
with China would get into the lion's den…[I]t would be very risky for our manufacturing and 
would be quite damaging to employment in Colombia’ (qtd. in El Colombiano, 2012). 
Agriculture was the only sector defending an FTA with China. Rafael Mejía of the 
Agricultural Society of Colombia (SAC) argued that ‘the Asian giant brings great business 
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opportunities for its partners and for the creation of jobs’ (Portafolio, 2012), echoing Santos’ 
arguments about China’s giant population and demands for food (Portafolio, 2013).  
Turning to Congressional allies, Colombia’s industrialists raised a credible threat of 
moderate political costs. Members of Santos’ coalition, including the Conservatives and his 
Partido de la U, echoed ANDI’s arguments that China was an unfair trader and Colombia had 
‘nothing to win’ (Caracol Radio, 2012a). The breadth of opposition made it clear Santos 
lacked the votes for an FTA, and that pushing it further could damage the president’s 
legislative support at a critical political juncture. Despite the agro-lobby’s enthusiasm, the 
first meeting between Colombian and Chinese officials to explore bilateral negotiations was 
scuttled directly on the heels of an August 2013 in a Commerce Ministry meeting that 
convened ANDI and SAC (El Tiempo, 2013). However, opposition did not entirely end 
Colombian government attempts to boost economic relations with China. Instead, the 
government engaged in policy substitution, negotiating a bilateral investment treaty that 
accomplished some of the government’s goals and avoided foreclosing economic talks with 
China. Investment liberalization faced less opposition from the industrial sector than trade 
liberalization. Though the two governments still mentioned a possible FTA, there was no 
progress amidst continued opposition.  
If this case conformed with the presidentialist assumptions, the president would have 
bypassed or co-opted the domestic opposition from those who feared Chinese competition. 
Presidents may respond to this opposition by subsidizing losers or creating an overriding 
Congressional coalition around exporter interests to push forward the agreement. A similar 
process occurred in Colombian FTAs with the United States and South Korea, in which 
opposed interests were placated with subsidies. Regarding China, however, stronger and 
more widespread domestic opposition halted FTA negotiations and pushed Santos to a weak 
form of policy substitution.  
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Case 4: Colombia and Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice 
Colombian presidents and the Foreign Ministry have long emphasised respect for 
international law as a pillar of Colombian international identity and foreign policy, even in 
cases where substantial sovereign territorial interests were at stake. The most prominent 
case—which shows how high costs threatened by domestic opposition can reverse 
presidential preferences—involved a dispute with Nicaragua. 
Since 1980, Nicaragua has contested Colombian possession of San Andrés, along 
with neighbouring smaller islands, cays, and surrounding waters. The disagreement originates 
with a treaty, signed by a US-occupied Nicaragua in 1928, that granted Colombia authority 
over the islands and waters, while recognizing Nicaraguan sovereignty over its Caribbean 
coast and two nearby islands. Colombia interpreted the treaty as a definitive declaration of a 
maritime border at the 82nd meridian; Nicaragua argued that because the country was under 
foreign occupation at the time of signing, the treaty should be void. In 2001, Nicaragua’s 
government took the case to the International Court of Justice, to which both Colombia and 
Nicaragua granted compulsory jurisdiction.  
During the decade-long legal dispute, Colombian Presidents Pastrana, Uribe, and 
Santos all emphasized that Colombia was fully committed to respecting its international 
commitments under the 1948 Pact of Bogotá, in which Latin American states pledged to 
solve territorial disputes through compulsory ICJ arbitration. Every Colombian president 
since 2001 had declared that the court’s ruling on the San Andrés dispute would be respected 
regardless of its content. President Santos and his government stressed that the Pact of 
Bogotá shaped core Colombian preferences in the matter, even when a declaration from the 
court signalled potential trouble for Colombia by denying that the 1928 treaty established a 
definitive maritime border. Though the statement opened up questions about Colombia’s 
control over the waters and islands east of the 82nd meridian, Colombian Foreign Minister 
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María Ángela Holguín insisted in April 2012 that Colombia would respect the ICJ’s authority 
in border disputes, even if the final ruling partially rejected Colombian pretensions. Days 
before the ruling, she stated that the court’s decisions usually gave ‘a little bit to one part and 
another bit to the other’ (Holguín, 2012). Such a ruling, the Santos administration argued, 
would be favourable for Colombia nevertheless, since Nicaragua claimed the islands and all 
surrounding waters. The foreign minister stressed adherence to international law.  
The backlash started almost immediately, with a group in Congress demanding 
Holguín’s resignation, invoking an absolute need to defend Colombian territory (Caracol 
Radio, 2012b). Facing growing pressure, the Santos administration launched a public 
relations offensive based on the idea that Colombia would inevitably win and see its territory 
preserved (León 2012). The November 2012 ruling was, as Holguín had intimated, 
salomonic. The ICJ recognised that the 1928 treaty gave Colombia authority over the islands 
and cays east of 82°, but assigned most surrounding waters to Nicaragua. Longstanding 
expressions of presidential preferences, restated before political pressure began to mount in 
April, suggested that Colombia would accept the ruling. Instead, the decision became highly 
contentious for reasons owing less to the facts of the ruling than to the costs threatened by 
domestic opposition.  
The political context created opportunities and incentives for the opposition to exploit 
the ruling and challenge Santos. In the preceding years, the coalition that had supported 
Santos as Uribe’s designated successor had disintegrated into an intense political feud 
between uribistas and Santos’ followers. Santos’s re-election campaign has gotten under way 
shortly before the ruling, and Uribe indicated that he would designate a follower to oppose 
Santos. In that political context, Uribe ideologically mobilised questions of territorial 
sovereignty to oppose the ruling for electoral advantage—even though Uribe’s own 
government had argued the case at the ICJ and similarly pledged adherence to the decision.  
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Santos’ followers denounced Uribe for ‘playing politics’ and accused him of hypocrisy (El 
Universal, 2012). The retorts fell flat, as Uribe took advantage of Santos’ vulnerability on the 
issue to threaten high costs – quite possibly electoral defeat. Ultimately, Santos gave in to 
Uribe’s political gambit and declared that the ICJ ruling would be recognised ‘but not 
applied’. With weak legal justifications, Santos cited the constitutional requirement that new 
borders be established by a formal treaty. Santos not only reversed his previous positions on 
the Nicaraguan case, he eroded the Colombian international legal tradition by withdrawing 
the country from its 60-year commitment to the Bogotá Pact.  
If this case conformed with the presidentialist assumptions, one could expect Santos 
to maintain the commitment to accept the ICJ ruling and insulate the issue from domestic 
opposition. The case was not expected to create much turmoil, given the longstanding 
consensus on accepting the ICJ’s ruling – a consensus that had included Uribe. However, in a 
context of rapidly strengthening opposition from Uribe against Santos and his peace deal, the 
ruling became one more avenue for the former president’s attacks against his successor. 
Uribe’s ideological framing of the issue pitted Colombian nationalism against its 
international juridical tradition. Even though the Santos administration initially considered 
the ruling a moderate success, once Uribe raised the stakes, Santos backtracked and reversed 
decades of Colombian foreign policy. 
Presidentialism and Alternative Explanations  
Three of the cases above illustrate how domestic opposition can reshape or reject Colombian 
presidents’ foreign policy preferences. This suggests the need for models in CFPA that 
encompass presidents’ leading role while also recognizing domestic actors and processes. 
Contested presidentialism brings a broader set of domestic actors into focus and shows how 
they can affect policy by using institutional and political veto points to impose costs. Still, the 
explanatory utility of the model should be compared against alternatives present in the 
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literature. Having discussed strong presidentialism above, we now discuss our cases with 
respect to three other explanations (Table 1, below). The role of external constraints is 
emphasised in LAFPA. We also examine two explanations beyond presidentialism, 
bureaucratic opposition (Darnton, 2014) and political coalitions (Schenoni, 2017), to account 
for the divergent outcomes. While helpful, these explanations fall short against the evidence.  
Colombia could be considered a ‘most likely’ case for US influence throughout the 
period. However, external constraints, understood as structural factors or direct US 
opposition, do not perform well against the cases. The exception is Plan Colombia, in which 
US and Colombian presidential preferences largely coincided. Pastrana’s preferred foreign 
policy advanced even as his peace talks with the FARC failed. However, US preferences 
moderately diverge from the outcome of the US basing agreement case under Uribe, and the 
US role has limited relevance in the ICJ case. While one might imagine that US pressures 
prompted the rejection of a Chinese FTA, this does not emerge from the details of the case. 
Nor does it concur with external evidence; major US trading partners in the region, notably 
Peru, established FTAs with China. Objections from the Obama administration were muted.  
Recent work highlights the importance of bureaucratic opposition or acquiescence 
(Darnton, 2014) and coalitional politics (Schenoni, 2017) to Latin American foreign 
policymaking. A bureaucratic explanation is congruent with the outcome of the Plan 
Colombia case, but is at least partially contradicted in the three divergent cases. The strongest 
Colombian bureaucratic actors had much to gain from Plan Colombia, and they supported 
presidential preferences. While this is congruent with expectations, those same actors 
favoured the basing agreement under Uribe. However, their positions – like the president’s – 
were rejected by the Constitutional Court. In the proposed China FTA, relevant bureaucratic 
interests favoured the deal, but lacked support outside the government and could not advance 
their preferences. With respect to the ICJ decision, the Foreign Ministry supported adherence 
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to international law, but exercised little influence on Santos’ ultimate position. Bureaucratic 
opposition was not key to the rejection of presidential preferences in any of the three 
divergent cases.  
A coalitional explanation is complementary to some of the veto processes highlighted 
here. Coalitional politics help account for the China FTA’s failure, though the divide between 
industry and agriculture introduces ambiguity. Ultimately, industry had better coalitional 
options and enjoyed more institutional access. For Plan Colombia and the US bases, no broad 
opposition coalition emerged, despite criticism from the left. Despite coalitional weakness, 
institutional factors allowed for a judicial rejection of presidential basing preferences. A 
coalitional argument appears congruent with Santos’ turnabout on the ICJ decision; beyond a 
few international lawyers and diplomats, no group called for accepting the adverse ruling. 
That gave Santos space to reverse course and seek to pre-empt the formation of an opposition 
coalition that would worsen his electoral difficulties. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Strong presidentialism, external constraints, and bureaucratic opposition perform 
poorly against our cases; coalitional politics, closest to our model, provides a useful general 
approach in three cases. We now analyse the three cases of successful opposition through 
contested presidentialism.  
In case two, President Uribe, with Santos as his defence minister, showed clear 
preferences for formal US military bases. Aware of the issue’s political and regional 
sensitivity, Uribe tried to exclude the issue from domestic contestation by drafting an 
agreement that eschewed the need for Congressional ratification. However, an ideologically 
opposed minority appealed to the Constitutional Court as a veto point to halt foreign bases. 
The Court partially supported their position by demanding Congressional ratification of a 
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new agreement, a moderate political cost that Uribe had already signalled he would not 
accept. Santos, now president, turned to policy substitution, allowing the United States to use 
Colombian bases without a formal agreement. 
In the rejection of a proposed FTA with China, Santos reiterated the negotiation’s 
importance for his economic agenda. However, distributional concerns prompted intense 
mobilization of economic interests that felt threatened by liberalised trade with China. These 
interests worked through Congress, where opposition was more cohesive and potent than in 
the electorate as a whole, to threaten an institutional veto. These interest groups, mainly 
manufacturers, were able to impose moderate costs – not a loss of office, but a challenge to 
the Congressional support of a president who badly needed it. As such, the executive opted 
for a weak form of policy substitution via an investment agreement while indefinitely 
delaying a deeper economic deal.  
In the ICJ case, decades of Colombian state policy – embraced by the Santos 
administration – stressed adherence to international law and arbitration. However, Uribe 
mobilised ideological concerns around territorial sovereignty, using national sentiments to 
appeal to electoral channels. Unexpectedly for Santos and his foreign ministry, Uribe 
skilfully deployed the ruling in a popular challenge, which became salient because of the 
electoral calendar and Santos’ relative political weakness. The credible threat of high political 
costs – loss of office in the coming elections – impeded Santos from accepting the ruling. 
Facing that challenge, he backed away from his previous position, with no notable policy 
substitution. 
These three cases contrast with the case of Plan Colombia, where domestic opposition 
lacked access to political or institutional veto points and could not effectively impose 
political costs. In that case, President Pastrana maintained substantial isolation of the 
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decision-making process even in the face of domestic opponents who denounced Colombia’s 
subordination to the goals and methods of US drug policy.  
Conclusion 
This article has challenged the determinism and narrow focus of commonplace presidentialist 
assumptions in CFPA. Clearly, presidents matter; however, three of our cases provide 
evidence of anomalies that are not well explained under the limits of the commonly employed 
presidentialist lens. Our model of ‘contested presidentialism’ recognises the clear role of the 
president but suggests more encompassing ways to understand the role of domestic politics in 
Colombian foreign policy. We foreground the costs imposed on presidents, as well as the 
mechanisms open in opposing foreign policy. Domestic actors and institutions may be less 
visible than presidents, but they affect policy processes, impose costs, and shape Colombian 
foreign policy in ways unanticipated by the current literature and even by presidents 
themselves. Our argument goes beyond bureaucratic and coalition explanations to illustrate 
the complex domestic political environment and potential costs that Colombian presidents 
face in foreign policymaking. 
While our study is limited in terms of generalisability, the presidentialist assumption 
is common throughout LAFPA, not only regarding Colombia. An additional limitation of our 
study emerges from the pragmatic assumption of revealed presidential preferences as a 
starting point; however if presidents anticipate domestic opposition in their preference 
formation, domestic influence may be even greater. This requires closer study. Contested 
presidentialism suggests avenues for future research into how other political and institutional 
contexts shape possible veto points and mechanisms for imposing costs. Additional research 
may use our model to examine presidential success as well, exploring how and when 
presidents insulate the foreign policy process against domestic opposition. Latin American 
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presidents elsewhere may face similar pressures in different contexts. In foreign policy, Latin 
American presidents may be first movers, but they do not always have the last word. 
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Figure 1: Presidents and Domestic Opposition in Foreign Policy 
Table 1: Alternative explanations 
Is the model supported?  
Case External Presidentialism Bureaucratic Coalitional 
Plan Colombia Y Y Y Y 
ICJ N N N Y 
China FTA N N N Y 
Bases N N N N 
